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Oxford Handbook of the History of Ethics, ed Roger Crisp (2013) 
 
Styles of Moral Relativism – A Critical Family Tree 
 
 
Custom Is King – The Significance of Moral Diversity 
 
Casting an eye back over the history of moral relativist thinking, one can discern a 
number of different branches to the family tree, each representing a different impetus 
to relativism, and so producing a different style of moral relativist thought. At root, 
however, is a broadly subjectivist parent idea, namely that morality is at least in part 
the upshot of a shared way of life, and shared ways of life tend to vary markedly from 
culture to culture. Differences of custom have been observed since the beginning of 
history. A well known passage from Herodotus, the ancient Greek historian, in which 
he tells a story about Darius, King of the Persians, gives us an indication of how long 
human beings have been aware of, and intrigued or disconcerted by, the fact of moral 
difference: 
 
When he was king of Persia, he summoned the Greeks who happened to be 
present at his court, and asked them what they would take to eat the dead 
bodies of their fathers. They replied that they would not do it for any money in 
the world. Later, in the presence of the Greeks, and through an interpreter, so 
that they could understand what was said, he asked some Indians, of the tribe 
called Callatiae, who do in fact eat their parents’ dead bodies, what they would 
take to burn them. They uttered a cry of horror and forbade him to mention 
such a dreadful thing (Herodotus 440BCE; trans. Sélincourt, 1988, pp. 219-
20).
1
 
 
Why might an awareness of moral diversity prompt the relativist conclusion 
that morality itself is relative to culture? (Or, in the terms sometimes used, why might 
an awareness of descriptive relativism prompt an inference to meta-ethical 
                                                
1
 This passage is frequently quoted: see, for instance, Levy 2002, p. 89; and 
Baghramian, 2004, pp. 21-2. 
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relativism?) It does so principally on the assumption that in the moral domain the best 
explanation of diversity is relativity. Accordingly, there is a tendency to read moral 
relativism off the surface of foreign moral practices. However, this tendency is 
dangerous, for ‘moral practices’—in the straightforward sense of what goes on 
apparently within the bounds of the morality of a given culture—can be a matter 
merely of what certain types can get away with, and others have resigned themselves 
to, rather than what the collective endorses as morally permissible, let alone good. 
This question of endorsement has been raised in stark form by Mary Midgley in a 
discussion of the Samurai custom of tsujigiri,
 
and Midgley’s point is further 
developed by Michele Moody-Adams (Midgeley 1981; Moody-Adams 1997). As the 
story goes, there was a custom among medieval Japanese Samurai of ‘trying out’ 
one’s sword before battle, by testing its capability of slicing through a human torso 
with one blow. This test is said to have been inflicted at random on the hapless passer-
by. 
 
On the face of it, this might plausibly be presented as an example of just how 
radically different foreign or historically distant practices can be within the moral. It 
is the sort of example that is often used to expose our latent relativist sympathies by 
prompting the thought, ‘What was morally appropriate for a medieval Samurai is 
radically different from what is morally appropriate for anyone in our culture’. As 
Moody-Adams argues, however, this is a perfidious line of thought, for it begs the 
question by assuming that such arbitrary slaughter on the part of a Samurai was 
morally appropriate for him in his time. That is to say, it makes the unwarranted 
assumption that there were not articulate moral points of view from which the practice 
might have been challenged—people with social experiences that equipped them with 
adequate critical tools to protest the practice in its own time.  
 
Moody-Adams expresses agreement with Midgley in this connection, 
affirming that ‘as Midgley suggests, the assumption that there was uniform cultural 
approval of the practice requires a further, problematic assumption: that endangered 
passersby would have generally consented to be sacrificed to the ritual’ (Moody-
Adams 1997, p. 82). While consent may not be quite the issue—after all, I might 
withhold consent to many a moral practice my better judgement would endorse—still 
the general point is well taken. The worry about assuming that the existence of a 
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certain bloody practice on the part of Samurai warriors in medieval Japan signals the 
moral acceptability of that practice in medieval Japan, is that this assumption may 
amount to little more than a way of siding with the abuser. As Neil Levy puts the 
point, ‘we can appreciate the force of the claim that relativism sides with the strong 
against the weak. If we conclude that tsujigiri is permissible in medieval Japan, we 
are allowing the rapacious Samurai to dictate what counts as morality for everyone’ 
(Levy 2002, p. 112.) This is well put; indeed we should acknowledge, further, that the 
Samurai may have had the social power to get away with the abuse in a double sense, 
not only getting away with it in practice, but also in collective conscience, in so far as 
there may have been no collective hermeneutical habit of challenging it by naming it 
as brutal, dishonourable, murderous, or otherwise wrong. In such a situation, Samurai 
warriors would effectively possess the power to pre-emptively silence dissent, and so 
to constitutively construct their sword-testing killings as morally acceptable in their 
time—to make the practice count as morally acceptable. But this does not mean that it 
was, even then. 
 
In any case, we should acknowledge that the scenario of such successful 
constitutive construction is improbable. The Samurai very likely did not have quite 
that kind of power, for as Midgley suggests, there would not have been sufficiently 
widespread moral endorsement of the practice, explicit or tacit—certainly the soon-to-
be murdered party would not have endorsed it in any way, or anyone else likely to 
share his interests, either because they cared about him personally, or because they 
could see that they were at similar risk, or could imaginatively identify with those at 
risk. Such elementary exercises of the moral imagination were surely not beyond the 
folk who cohabited the medieval Samurai ‘moral culture’. And there’s the rub: what 
supposed ‘moral culture’ are we talking about here? Did these roaming, sword 
wielding individuals really belong to an integrated and self-contained moral culture 
that cast their practices as honourable; or should we suspect this to be a fantasy of the 
relativist imagination? Moody-Adams makes a powerful case against the habit of 
positing ‘moral cultures’ conceived in this way as fully integrated and self-contained 
systems, for such monoliths are incompatible with the fact that the discursive space of 
morality is essentially contested: 
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Even traditional societies generate ‘liminal’ space (however ritually 
structured) that creates room for various kinds of cultural criticism. Any effort 
at transhistorical moral inquiry and reflection implicitly appeals to this liminal 
‘cultural space’ for moral criticism (Moody-Adams 1997, p. 85). 
 
Moody-Adams is surely right to suspect that some relativist writers are bewitched by 
exoticism. If one looks to grubbier examples in the present, such as the organized 
thuggery of the Sicilian mafia or the Chinese Triads operating in many cities today, 
there is far less temptation to infer moral equality for something called the ‘mafia 
moral culture’ supposedly owned not only by the mafia themselves but also their 
victims. Real, evolving moral cultures are never disconnected from the dissenting 
voices of those on the losing end, however muffled some of them might be. This is 
key to understanding why morality is an essentially critical domain in which many, 
often conflicting, points of view are fit for articulation. That is why we cannot 
automatically read deep moral difference off the surface of foreign moral practices. 
 
 All this reminds us that one must be very careful about what to infer, if 
anything, from the observation of surface differences of custom. Accordingly we must 
be equally careful about attributing such inferences to others. Michel de Montaigne is 
standardly interpreted as implicitly making just such an inference to relativism; but 
we shall see that the relativist’s pretension to him as a sixteenth-century French 
ancestor involves a careless leap of genealogy. Montaigne was the first essayist. He 
coined the term essai—literally, an ‘attempt’—in order to create a self-effacing 
rhetorical space in which to express his reflections, always insisting he was merely 
writing about himself, with no aspiration to authoritative comment on anything 
outside. Though the essays are unquestionably a self-portrait, the declared aim of 
mere self-revelation, combined with his stance of beguiling irony, allowed Montaigne 
to publicise his bold output without serious risk of being judged impious before God. 
In ‘Of Cannibals’, he does, as is so often observed, emphasize diversity of moral 
custom in a way that echoes Herodotus; and the essay apparently strikes many 
philosopher-readers, with an ear trained to pick up on anything sounding a bit like a 
meta-ethical thesis, as an oblique argument for the idea that custom is all there is to 
morality. Not just descriptive relativism, then, but meta-ethical relativism too. Neil 
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Levy, for instance, introduces perhaps the most frequently quoted sentence from 
Montaigne as follows: 
 
Reflecting on this diversity, many European intellectuals came to precisely the 
same conclusion as had Herodotus before them. Moral disagreements reflect 
the differences between local customs, no more and no less. Thus, for 
example, Michel de Montaigne…reacts to reports of widespread cannibalism 
by just such a relativism. ‘I think there is nothing barbarous and savage in that 
nation, from what I have been told, except that each man calls barbarism 
whatever is not his own practice; for indeed it seems we have no other test of 
truth and reason than the example and pattern of the opinions and customs of 
the country we live in’ (Levy 2002, p. 91). 
 
Moody-Adams also brings in Montaigne as a relativist: 
 
‘Each man calls barbarism whatever is not his own practice,’ Montaigne 
claimed, because ‘we have no other test of truth and reason than the example 
and pattern of the opinions and customs of the country we live in’… 
Montaigne’s observation reminds us that relativism about diverse moral 
practices is not a new development (Moody-Adams 1997, p. 13).  
 
Maria Baghramian too reads Montaigne as a relativist, though she is careful to relate 
the relativism to his deep-seated Pyrrhonian scepticism, introducing him as ‘The most 
notable proponent of both scepticism and relativism in the early modern period’, and 
rightly emphasizing his combination of interest in diversity of customs with tolerance 
(Baghramian 2004, p. 51). Steven Lukes, despite a sensitivity to the ambivalence in 
Montaigne’s essay, ultimately characterizes Montaigne as a relativist with 
inconsistently universalistic tendencies (Lukes 2008, pp. 31-2). With the exception of 
David Wiggins, who interprets Montaigne in what I believe to be the right spirit—that 
is, not as a relativist but as a sceptical essayist keen to emphasize the cardinal 
importance of cultural context when it comes to morals
2
—it seems that in much 
                                                
2
 ‘The philosophical point of paying heed to Montaigne’s essay…is for us to study the 
interpretive power of contextualism as Montaigne practises it, and to perceive the 
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philosophical discussion Montaigne has been pinned not only as an important 
influence in relativistic thinking about morality (which indeed he seems to have 
become), but as himself advancing moral relativism. This last is however very 
unfortunate, since Montaigne does no such thing.  
 
That such a rigid interpretation would falsify Montaigne’s playful text is 
indicated even by the sentence immediately following the one so often quoted. The 
indicative sentence in question mockingly qualifies ‘the country we live in’ with the 
sardonic rejoinder: ‘There we always see the perfect religion, the perfect political 
system, the perfect and most accomplished way of doing everything’ (Montaigne, 
1958, p. 109). Montaigne’s point in the much quoted sentence is not that there are no 
universal or absolute standards for what is morally right. Rather, he is delivering a 
sceptical jibe at how his fellow countrymen tend to be hopelessly chauvinistic when it 
comes to making sense of the customs of cultures alien to their own—a 
disappointment to be understood in the context of his more general sceptical opinion 
that such epistemic failure characterizes the human condition. Part of the general 
diagnosis he offers is that we are too often dependent upon unreliable testimony. 
Indeed the essay opens with this theme, and recounts the story of Pyrrhus, King of 
Epirus, as he encountered the well-ordered Roman army for the first time:  
 
King Pyrrhus remarked: ‘I do not know what barbarians these are’—for so the 
Greeks called all foreign nations—‘but the ordering of the army before me has 
nothing barbarous about it.’…We can see from this how chary we must be of 
subscribing to vulgar opinions; we should judge them by the test of reason and 
not by common report (Montaigne 1958, p. 105). 
 
Naturally, Montaigne’s overall purpose becomes clearer as the essay progresses. 
Indeed the essay ultimately makes it plain that it has nothing to do with advancing the 
meta-ethical thesis of relativism, or indeed any meta-ethical thesis. On the contrary, 
the essay is primarily a barbed lament directed against the hypocrisy of his own 
nation, which he finds not only too quick to judge foreign customs, but also culpably 
                                                                                                                                      
reach of criticism across difference and the reach of agreement over difference’ 
(Wiggins 2006, p. 349). 
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disinclined to turn its critical gaze upon itself and confront the horrifying excesses of 
a France wracked by religious civil war. The ironically fantasized Other to 
contemporary French consciousness in Montaigne’s discussion is that recent addition 
to the European imagination, the intriguing savages of the New World. The practices 
at home which Montaigne is primarily concerned to bring to the reader’s attention 
(about which he is notably candid, if brief, in contrast to the digressive pace and 
twinkling irony of much of the essay) are those most grotesque forms of violence 
perpetrated against the living in the brutal hostilities between Catholic and Huguenot 
parties. Acknowledging fully the moral abhorrence of cannibalism, he none the less 
dares to find that when understood in the light of reason it turns out to compare rather 
favourably with these home grown abominations:  
 
I am not so anxious that we should note the horrible savagery of these acts as 
concerned that, whilst judging their faults so correctly, we should be so blind 
to our own. I consider it more barbarous to eat a man alive than to eat him 
dead; to tear by rack and torture a body still full of feeling, to roast it by 
degrees, and then give it to be trampled and eaten by dogs and swine—a 
practice which we have not only read about but seen within recent memory, 
not between ancient enemies, but between neighbours and fellow-citizens and, 
what is worse, under the cloak of piety and religion—than to roast and eat a 
man after he is dead (Montaigne 1958, p. 113). 
 
To hammer the point home—making it still more abundantly clear, incidentally, that 
he is entirely open to the making of non-relative moral judgements, whether about the 
alleged customs of the New World or those of the old, and in the name of reason to 
boot—he adds: ‘We are justified therefore in calling these people barbarians by 
reference to the laws of reason, but not in comparison with ourselves, who surpass 
them in every kind of barbarity’ (Montaigne, 1958, p. 114).  People who live in glass 
houses… 
 
‘Of Cannibals’ employs an ironic conceit whereby the author poses as 
primarily interested in vindicating the alien customs of the New World (amusingly 
 8 
romanticized by Montaigne
3
) when in fact his main interest is in criticizing barbarism 
at home. Although the essay, as Lukes rightly observes, contains ‘relativist-sounding 
passages’ (Lukes 2008, p. 32), at least to the analytical ear; none of these in fact forms 
any part of a case for moral relativism. The real point of the essay is neither moral-
cultural description, nor meta-ethical thesis. Its message is above all political, for 
Montaigne’s primary purpose is to get away with making a political point about the 
horrors of his own distressed country. While the discussion of cannibalism reflects a 
genuine interest in the significance of moral diversity, it equally serves as a conceit 
that permits Montaigne to hold up a salutary mirror to a hypocritical French nation. 
Contrary, then, to a philosophical idée reçue, the sage of Gascony was not a relativist. 
 
With Montaigne duly pruned from our family tree of moral relativism (though 
not, one hopes, thereby removed from philosophical attention), let us retrace our 
finger back to an ancient progenitor other than Herodotus, with a view to identifying 
more genuine branches. 
 
 
 
Man Is The Measure – Subjectivist Roots 
 
Now, Protagoras, ‘Man is the measure of all things’ as you people say—of 
white and heavy and light and all that kind of thing without exception. He has 
the criterion of these things within himself; so when he thinks that they are as 
he experiences them, he thinks what is true and what really is for him (Plato 
1997, 178b; quoted in Baghramian, 2004, p. 26). 
 
Protagoras is generally taken as the ancient origin for a different style of moral 
relativism, not this time the style inspired by the observation of moral-cultural 
differences read off as deep, but one inspired rather by something more purely 
philosophical: the proposition that properties taken to be objective features of the 
                                                
3
 Quoting Seneca, Montaigne imagines Plato full of admiration for the simple way of 
life led by the people of the New World: ‘How far from such perfection would he find 
the republic that he imagined: “men fresh from the hands of the gods”’ (Montaigne 
1958, p. 110). 
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world are ‘really’ the product of human sensibility—the work of a ‘criterion’ within 
the subject.
4
 Various interpretations of the dictum are attributable to Protagoras via 
Plato, for it expresses a promiscuous subjectivism equally amenable to liaison with 
sensory experience, knowledge, truth, objects, and justice.
5
 The immediate upshot in 
relation to any of these is that what may seem objective to us is really subjective, and 
perhaps that we are actively misled in this by the innately objectivising nature of our 
experiences. Descendants from this kind of subjectivism are surely many, no doubt 
appropriately traced by way of Hobbes’ famous assertion: 
 
But whatsoever is the object of any mans Appetite or Desire; that is it, which 
he for his part calleth Good: And the object of his Hate, and Aversion, Evill; 
And of his Contempt. Vile and Inconsiderable. For these words of Good, 
Evill, and Contemptible, are ever used with relation to the person that useth 
them: There being nothing simply and absolutely so (Hobbes, 1991; ch. 6, p. 
39).  
 
Subsequent subjectivists have tended to be moved by a sense, first, of the contrast 
between primary and secondary qualities, the latter alone displaying a dependence on 
human sensibility that calls for the label ‘subjective’; combined, second, with a sense 
that secondary qualities and moral properties are analogous in terms of their 
metaphysics and epistemology. Most notably, Hume’s moral subjectivism was 
fundamentally inspired by this combination of commitments, as was Mackie’s after 
him;
6
 though importantly, Hume was no moral relativist, his emphasis being on the 
                                                
4
 See, however, Richard Bett for the view that not only were the Sophists not 
generally relativists, but that pace Plato even Protagoras should probably not be taken 
as a relativist. Bett emphasizes Sextus’ interpretation, which he summarizes: 
‘Protagoras held that things are really, in themselves, all the various ways they are 
perceived as being by different people… And this makes Protagoras not a relativist 
but, as E. R. Dodds long ago pointed out, “an extreme realist”’ (Bett, 1989, p. 167). 
 
5
 See Baghramian 2004, 1.2. 
 
6
 ‘Take any action allow’d to be vicious… The vice entirely escapes you, as long as 
you consider the object… It lies in yourself, not in the object… Vice and virtue, 
therefore, may be compar’d to sounds, colours, heat and cold, which, according to 
modern philosophy, are not qualities in objects, but perceptions in the mind...’ (Hume 
1975). Mackie 1977, ch. 1.  
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extensive repertoire of humanly universal ‘natural virtues’, which contrasts with a 
small number of socially constructed ‘artificial virtues’ that prove the rule. Mackie 
did not quite argue for relativism either, though there was surely room for it, given his 
view of morality as ‘invention’. Subjectivism about moral value provides a fertile 
basis for moral relativism, but there can be no parthenogenesis. Something further is 
required. 
 
 This subjectivist tradition in moral philosophy does ultimately bring forth a 
range of historically significant relativist positions in twentieth-century moral 
philosophy, though here the tree divides into two branches. We might label these 
Moral Historicism, and Moral Reasons. The historicist line finds its prime advocate in 
Bernard Williams, though it would (as ever) be artificial to represent him as a lone 
voice in this regard. Notably one might mention Richard Rorty under the moral 
historicist head, as he often uses ‘historicist’ to characterize his brand of relativistic 
pragmatism. Rorty’s interest in history is, however, more a priori than historical, for 
his historicism falls out of a general sceptical stance towards all things presented as 
objective or universal. For this reason I shall discuss his view under the head of Moral 
Truth—a prior branching in our family tree, stemming not from the local subjectivism 
about value mentioned above, but from a subjectivism with global scope, under which 
morality is subsumed along with every other domain of human cognition. Rorty 
makes a double contrast with Williams because, first, Williams’ moral relativism is 
derived from a localized subjectivism specifically about value properties, and second, 
his interest in history derives from an imaginative engagement with the past (notably 
that of Ancient Greek culture) combined with a historically informed sense of the 
differences between ancient and modern.
7
 Our historicist branch, then, leads us to 
Williams’ moral relativism—the ‘relativism of distance’. 
 
 
Moral Historicism 
 
                                                
7
 This interest permeates much of Williams’ work, but see in particular Shame and 
Necessity (Williams 1993). 
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I have introduced Williams in relation to a broadly Humean subjectivism about value, 
but it is instructive to note that he labels his own view negatively rather than 
positively, using instead the term ‘non-objectivist’. He has good reason, for he aims to 
distance it from some of the theses associated with the broad label ‘subjectivist’. 
Firstly, the term ‘subjectivist’ can indicate a semantic thesis about the meaning of 
moral sentences—that they report, express, or merely evince a moral sentiment—and 
Williams does not want to commit himself to any such thing (nor did Mackie, who for 
the same reason preferred to describe his view as a kind of moral ‘scepticism’). 
Secondly, subjectivism is commonly associated with the denial of moral truth and 
knowledge, but Williams gives a positive account of these things, albeit in non-
objectivist terms. That is to say, moral knowledge is knowledge within an ethical 
outlook, and is gained through the correct application of the thick ethical concepts 
proper to that outlook. (Thick ethical concepts are moral concepts of the kind 
effectively introduced by Philippa Foot in a defence of the reasoned nature of moral 
arguments.
8
 In Williams’ treatment, they are further explained as ethical concepts that 
are not only ‘action-guiding’ but also ‘world-guided’ in that they have sufficiently 
substantial empirical content to permit robust conditions of application.
9
) Williams’ 
relativism of distance is intriguingly allied with moral cognitivism, and thereby with 
much of what relativism is normally conceived as threatening to undermine.  
 
 What is Williams’ view? His early statement, given in ‘The Truth in 
Relativism’ and adhered to later in Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, remains the 
marker, as he never deviated from its basic argument: the truth in relativism is that 
over a certain kind of historical distance, specified in the idea of a merely ‘notional 
confrontation’ between two moral cultures, moral appraisal becomes inappropriate, 
because too much of its normal point is missing (Williams, 1981 and 1985). Two 
                                                
8
 See Foot 1958. See also Iris Murdoch: ‘if we picture the agent as compelled by 
obedience to the reality he can see, he will not be saying “This is right”, i.e., “I choose 
to do this”, he will be saying “This is A B C D” (normative-descriptive words), and 
action will follow naturally’ (Murdoch 1970, p. 42). 
 
9
 Williams rejects Hare’s prescriptivist account of moral concepts, which presents 
their descriptive and evaluative aspects as separable components. Instead he favours 
the view that these aspects are not separable, and in a note credits this idea to 
Murdoch and Foot. 
 
 12 
moral cultures or ‘systems’ are in notional confrontation when they fail to be in ‘real 
confrontation’ (when one is not a ‘real option’ for a group of people in the other). 
That is, if a group from one system could not go over to the moral outlook of the 
other—really living it out in practice, with the associated moral psychology becoming 
internalized as their own way of life—then the relation between the two moral 
systems is not one of real confrontation, but merely notional confrontation. In a 
situation such as this, moral appraisal cannot play its essential role as part of deciding 
how one should live, and so becomes inappropriate: 
 
A relativist view of a given type of outlook can be understood as saying that 
for such outlooks it is only in real confrontations that the language of 
appraisal—good, bad, right, wrong, and so on—can be applied to them; in 
notional confrontations, this kind of appraisal is seen as inappropriate, and no 
judgments are made (Williams 1985, p. 161). 
 
Although in the early paper he did not rule out the possibility of synchronic notional 
confrontations over cultural distance, he makes it explicit in the later discussion in 
Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy and elsewhere that in the modern era there can be 
no synchronic application of relativism: ‘Relativism over merely spatial distance is of 
no interest or application in the modern world. Today all confrontations between 
cultures must be real confrontations…’ (Williams 1985, p. 163). The only kind of 
distance that makes for an application of moral relativism, then, is historical distance: 
‘Many outlooks that human beings have had are not real options for us now. The life 
of a Bronze Age chief or a medieval samurai are not real options for us: there is no 
way of living them’ (Williams 1985, p. 161).  
 
 The structure of the relativism of distance, then, is pre-conditional: real 
confrontation is a pre-condition of appropriate moral appraisal, so that over notional 
confrontation moral appraisal is inappropriate, and relativism applies. This structure 
allows the relativism to be expressed without self-refutation, for it avoids saying 
anything that would undermine the expression of the relativist thesis itself. By 
contrast, forms of relativism that infer from a premise of descriptive relativism to a 
conclusion that it is morally wrong to pass moral judgement on other cultures are 
famously embroiled in self-refutation, for their very assertion of moral relativism is 
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delivered as a non-relative moral claim. Williams levels this charge of self-refutation 
at the view he invents for the purpose, ‘vulgar relativism’; and some such charge is 
also, famously, the core of Plato’s much discussed attack on Protagoras.
10
 What is 
especially significant about the relativism of distance is its ability to maintain so much 
of what moral realists hope to preserve from the objectivizing character of ethical 
experience and argument: moral truth, moral facts, moral knowledge, moral 
rationality. In Williams’ relativism these things are not as if, quasi, or otherwise 
ersatz, but authentic. The availability of moral truth is the key. An unembarrassed 
commitment to the possibility of moral truth became historically available owing to 
that moment in metaphysics which saw the arrival of various forms of deflationism or 
minimalism about truth, rendering it as a metaphysically undemanding predicate.
11
  
From then on, moral propositions could be represented as straightforwardly truth-apt 
without needing to posit any ‘queer’ action-guiding moral truth-makers, rubbing 
along as part of the ‘fabric of the world’, to use Mackie’s evocative terms (Mackie 
1977, p. 15). 
 
Putting this together with the comparatively uncontested idea that there can be 
moral beliefs, it becomes quickly apparent that moral knowledge too is possible, even 
on Williams’ non-objectivism about value—just plug in the preferred conception of 
warrant, and there you have it. We can now know that caning schoolboys is abusive, 
or that coerced sexual intercourse in marriage is rape; the Elizabethans could know 
that Queen Elizabeth was chaste, or not, as the case may be. This, as I see things, is 
how Williams’ distinctive historicism kicks in. Moral knowledge, on his conception, 
is fundamentally a kind of knowledge that constructs a collective way of life; and 
ways of life change through history. This means that the Elizabethans’ moral 
knowledge of their queen is only available to us in so far as ‘chaste’ is still one of our 
moral concepts. If it is not (and on the whole it isn’t) then we cannot know as a piece 
of moral knowledge that Elizabeth had the virtue of chastity. It is transformed into an 
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 See Williams 1972, p. 20; and Plato 1997 (Theaetatus 170d-171c). For a helpful 
discussion of the structure of Plato’s charge, see Baghramian 2004, 1.3. 
 
11
 See Wiggins 1987; Wright 1992, ch.5; and the papers (including those by Wright 
and Williams) in Hooker 1996. For more background on minimalism, see Horwich 
1998. 
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item, rather, of plain historical knowledge about their ethical way of life.
12
 We might 
say that when an item of moral knowledge is put out of our reach in this way—
Williams, perhaps provocatively, says ‘destroyed’—what history and reflection have 
removed from our lives, for good or ill, is the ethical force of the concept. As I see it, 
we can still apply the concept ‘chaste’ all right, imaginatively grasping its past role in 
disciplining female sexuality and conserving male heredity, or at any rate knowing it 
used to be a female virtue; but we can no longer do so with its ethical force in tact. 
That is to say, the concept no longer occupies the same place in our affective 
economy—it is no longer generally apt, for instance, to inspire feelings of shame in 
the agent, or of moral disapproval in others. (We might, for instance, think it highly 
unlikely Elizabeth was chaste, but be glad for her, and admire her genius in making 
the lurid obsession with female virginity work a little to her advantage in a gender-
performative cult of the Virgin Queen.) 
 
 But where does this leave us in relation to the most compellingly universal 
moral examples, such as the practice of slavery? In what sense, if any, might we 
reasonably judge ancient Greek slavery to be unjust or otherwise morally wrong if the 
ancients—free and enslaved alike—did not conceive it as such? Wiggins asked this 
sort of question in a way that resonated critically with Williams. He put the issue in 
terms of a defence of moral cognitivism to the effect that ‘there is nothing else to 
think but that slavery is unjust and insupportable’ (Wiggins 1991, p. 70). The 
challenge to this cognitivism, however, which Wiggins himself raises, is ‘how to 
demonstrate the necessity to speak in this connection of ‘injustice’—or even of 
‘slavery’?’ (Wiggins 1991, p. 78). That is, how to argue against the historicist claim 
that careful historical interpretation will sometimes reveal that even if there is nothing 
else to think now, there surely was something else to think back then, for there is no 
trans-historical necessity to bring the practice of slavery under these sorts of moral 
concepts, or perhaps any moral concepts. Wiggins’ answer to this envisaged challenge 
is to say that ‘the opponent…would have himself to show the workability of the 
scheme of moral ideas that dispenses in the face of phenomena such as the slave trade 
and its historical effects with ideas like “justice”, “slavery”, “using human beings as 
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 Williams does not quite say this, but I believe it is a corollary of his view. I argue 
the point more fully in Fricker 2000. 
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means not ends”, etc.’. But then, in relation to this answer, it must be acknowledged 
that Williams did go on to make just such a robust historical case for the view that the 
Greeks thought of slavery not in such moralized terms at all, but rather conceived it 
primarily as a practically necessary institution, and as a calamitous piece of bad luck 
for those individuals who are born or become enslaved:  
 
Slavery was taken to be necessary—necessary, that is to say, to sustaining the 
kind of political, social, and cultural life that free Greeks enjoyed. Most people 
did not suppose that because slavery was necessary, it was therefore just…The 
effect of the necessity was, rather, that life proceeded on the basis of slavery 
and left no space, effectively, for the question of its justice to be raised 
(Williams 1993, p. 124).  
 
Williams’ relativist cognitivism staunchly resisted the sort of trans-historical 
universalism about even such moral fundamentals as slavery that Wiggins’ non-
relativist (though always contextualist) cognitivism asserts. Although Williams’ 
relativism presents no obstacle to an assertion in the now that Greek slavery was 
unjust (or brutal, or cruel—there is no dependence here on Williams’ view that the 
concept of injustice is a special case
13
), the point is he regarded it as senseless to 
insist, beyond this, that the Greeks themselves should have regarded slavery as we do.  
Any such insistence could only figure as a piece of moralism, deriving either from 
specific historical ignorance, or else a general narcissistic refusal to acknowledge that 
there really have been other ways of life different from our own. 
 
 Williams’ relativism of distance, then, is part of a thoroughgoing historicism 
governing the existence of ethical value and availability of ethical knowledge for 
people in their time. The relativist thesis itself (the idea that moral appraisal is 
inappropriate over notional confrontation) is born of a dislike for the moralism that 
leads us to engage in moral appraisal over historical distances that do not sustain 
appraisal’s normal point. We could not go over to the Greek moral outlook, for the 
question of the moral status of slavery has arisen for us, and once it has arisen there is 
no going back; and, further, the answer to the question of the moral status of slavery 
                                                
13
 He considered the concept of (in)justice to be applicable even over notional 
confrontation, and so an exceptional case; see Williams 1985, p. 166. 
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is obvious, so that now there is indeed ‘nothing else to think but that slavery is unjust 
and insupportable’. An interest in the contingency and hence plurality of moral 
practices is at the heart of Williams’ historicism, but not in the sense we rehearsed at 
the outset with Herodotus, which is taken to suggest we should be so impressed by the 
astonishing diversity of moral customs that moral consciousness can but retreat into 
its own cultural shell. The relativism of distance is not a direct upshot of being 
impressed by moral diversity per se, for there is an indefinite amount of synchronic 
moral diversity across cultures in relation to which this relativism refuses application. 
The view is rather a reflective acknowledgement that over notional confrontation the 
practical point and therefore propriety of moral appraisal goes missing, owing to the 
fact that precisely at that distance, past moral practices become irrelevant to moral 
deliberation. At root, the relativism of distance is an oblique assertion of the idea—the 
signature Socratic idea with which Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy opens—that 
the fundamental question is how one should live. Williams’ relativism effectively 
indexes moral appraisal to its primary role in contributing to ongoing practical 
deliberation; and that is, most fundamentally, why he casts those ways of life to which 
we could not convert even if we wanted to as inappropriate objects of our moral 
appraisals. 
 
 I have argued elsewhere that the way Williams characterizes the distinction 
between real and notional confrontations does not draw the line of distance in the 
place he wants (Fricker 2010). The condition of real confrontation, that we could 
reconstruct the past outlook and live it for real in the present, is extremely socially 
and psychologically demanding, so that just about any past outlook lands outside the 
remit of appropriate moral appraisal—which is not what he intends. But, more than 
this, the question must also be asked: why should the possibility of moral conversion 
stand as a condition on appropriate moral appraisal? I have explained Williams’ 
reason as I understand it above; but I do not believe it is justified to confine practices 
of moral appraisal to the primary purpose of deciding how to live—of deciding, as he 
often puts it, ‘what to do about’ the cultural practice in question. Moral appraisal has 
other functions besides that one, not least the interpretive function of making sense of 
the past—ironically, a signature Williams concern. My suspicion is that the basic 
motive for the relativism of distance, namely Williams’ anti-moralism in relation to 
the past, would be better handled directly by specific critical attention to forms of 
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moralism themselves. This would allow him to attack them not for appraising what he 
must implausibly allege is simply beyond the remit of moral appraisal, but only for 
the moralism itself—whether it be the moralism of historically insensitive moral 
interpretation, or of excessive focus on the moral to the exclusion of other forms of 
value, or again that of blame being inappropriately directed towards individuals from 
the past.  
 
 Let us now leave the Moral Historicism branch of our family tree to trace a 
finger along the branch concerned with Moral Reasons. Here we meet Gilbert 
Harman’s conventionalist relativism, which was first advanced contemporarily with 
Williams’ historicist relativism, but which, despite a certain structural similarity, 
contrasts with it in many crucial respects. Most obviously, while the relativism of 
distance allowed that synchronic moral appraisal is always appropriate even between 
cultures with few shared moral concepts and reasons, the relativist position advanced 
by Harman posits shared reasons as a condition of all appropriate moral appraisal.  
 
 
Moral Reasons 
 
Harman’s relativism is explicitly motivated by the question of shared reasons for 
action, or what in his early statement he called ‘shared motivational attitudes’ 
(Harman 1982). In that paper he presents his relativism as a hypothesis about the 
‘logical form’ of sentences containing a distinctively moral use of ‘ought’. He 
distinguishes four uses of ‘ought’. There is the ‘ought’ of expectation (‘the bus ought 
to be along in a minute’); the ‘ought’ of rationality (‘the robber ought to have wiped 
his fingerprints before the getaway’); the ‘ought’ of general, non-moral regret (‘the 
tsunami ought not to have happened’); and then there is the ‘ought’ of morality (‘she 
ought not to have betrayed him’). Harman labels ought-statements of this last type 
‘inner judgements’. His hypothesis is that the logical form of moral statements is such 
that they have as a pre-condition that the judging and judged parties share 
‘motivational attitudes’, or moral reasons. (Like Williams’ relativism of distance, the 
structure of Harman’s relativism is such that it sets a pre-condition of appropriate 
moral judgement—a pre-condition which ushers in relativism wherever it fails—and 
thus the view avoids problems of self-refutation.) This means that any time there are 
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not the requisite shared motivational attitudes between two parties, no moral 
judgement can appropriately be made, and relativism applies. 
 
 On Harman’s view, then, in cases where the would-be judged party does not 
significantly share motivational attitudes with the judge, she or he is beyond the reach 
of moral judgement. The key example he uses is that of Hitler: ‘the agent judged 
[Hitler] seems beyond the pale—in other words beyond the motivational reach of the 
relevant moral considerations’ (Harman 1982, p. 193). According to Harman, all we 
can express in relation to Hitler involves the ‘ought’ not of inner judgements but only 
the unfocussed regret of judgements about states of affairs or situations. We may 
lament the historical fact of Nazi genocide thus: ‘the holocaust ought not to have 
happened’. In so far as this is a consequence of his view, however, then I would have 
thought it made more of a counter-example than a positive illustration. For Hitler is a 
paradigm of the sort of agent whom we can judge morally, and whose deeds make 
him a proper object of moral criticism and outrage of a focussed, ‘inner’ variety. The 
idea that we cannot judge him morally because of his evil psychology as absurd. A 
morality for which evil is beyond its remit is no morality at all; and a meta-ethic that 
casts morality in this mould cannot be right. 
 
We could defend a version of Harman’s view by pointing out that if there is 
something to this idea of shared motivational attitudes being a pre-condition of moral 
judgement, then it cannot possibly be a question of individuals sharing them as judge 
and judged parties. It must be a question rather of moral culture in what I have 
elsewhere called the ‘structural’ sense (Fricker 2010, p. 167 passim)—that is, in the 
sense of a concept designed to capture the idea that the relevant moral interpretations 
were suitably available to the judged party, so that he is culpable if he fails either to 
grasp them or otherwise live up to them. Hitler will have had the usual social 
exposure to everyday moral precepts against the evils of spreading hatred and 
perpetrating mass murder, whatever story might be told about him as an individual to 
explain how he came to think the thoughts and commit the crimes he did. So, on this 
finessing of Harman’s view, it would not be a consequence of it that the very 
psychology of evil placed the perpetrator ‘beyond the pale’ of moral appraisal, 
rendering them immune to moral censure. In so far as Harman holds that it does—and 
he does, for in the later work he reiterates the example in different but equivalent 
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terms (Harman 1996, p. 62)—one can only say that his intended condition of shared 
motivating attitudes is far too strong.  
 
 If Harman were to reply by appealing to the narrowly focussed nature of 
‘inner judgements’ owing to their special logical form, then this merely shows up the 
spurious nature of the terms in which the argument is conducted. The emphasis on the 
so-called ‘logical form’ of an allegedly well-defined class of statements called ‘moral’ 
(‘inner’) is a formal fig leaf for a material claim about the pre-conditions of moral 
judgement. In fairness to Harman, he is entirely clear that he is presenting a 
‘hypothesis’ that cannot be proved, but still, what remains spurious is the idea that 
moral statements have a distinctive logical form of a kind that could furnish a meta-
ethical thesis. The claim that the logical form of moral statements presupposes shared 
motivational attitudes is nothing more than the material claim that there is something 
off key about making moral judgements in respect of people who do not share in 
one’s reasons. I believe that something along these lines is an eminently sensible 
thought in respect of certain types of moral judgement—certain judgements of blame, 
for instance
14
— but as a general statement about moral judgements it is royally 
disputable, and it distinguishes the claim not in the slightest to dress it up as an insight 
into logical form. In fact, it obfuscates the issue, because it can only mislead people 
into thinking that the puzzle of the relative or absolute status of morality is to be 
solved by trying to identify something called the logical form of moral judgements, 
when what we should be trying to do is explore which sorts of cultural and historical 
distances can or cannot sustain the various forms of moral appraisal and 
accountability.  
 
 It must be said that in later work Harman mounts the argument far less in 
terms of logical form, and instead focuses on relativism as an inference to the best 
explanation from the observation of moral diversity (Harman 1996, section 1.2). His 
is the classic inference from descriptive relativism to meta-ethical relativism (the 
move which, I argued earlier, Montaigne did not make). He then argues by way of a 
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 I argue in Fricker 2010 that in circumstances in which the agent was structurally 
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blame are inappropriate. 
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powerful analogy: just as motion is relative to a given spatiotemporal framework, so 
moral judgements are relative to a moral framework:  
 
The moral relativist supposes that there are various moral frameworks from 
which moral issues can be judged and that none of these frameworks is 
objectively privileged, even though one might be specially salient to a given 
person: for example, the moral framework relevantly associated with that 
person’s values (Harman 1996, pp. 41-42). 
 
A moral framework is constituted by ‘a set of values (standards, principles, etc.), 
perhaps on the model of the laws of one or another state’ (Harman 1996, p. 13). One 
could perhaps make explicit the continuity with Harman’s early statement by adding 
that these shared moral conventions generate the shared motivational attitudes that 
stand as pre-conditional to moral judgement. 
 
This formulation in terms of frameworks could help mitigate my objection to 
the Hitler example somewhat, insofar as it invites the ‘structural’ reading: it stops a 
lone moral maverick or evil-doer counting as exempt from moral judgement, for 
whatever an individual’s moral depravity, one might suppose that the moral 
conventions of his culture, his framework, would still apply to him. It seems, 
however, that Harman does not intend the structural reading of ‘framework’, for he 
goes on to talk about moral frameworks not as social, collective entities but as 
individual moral outlooks. Distinguishing ‘critic relativity’ (relativity of the critic’s 
values) from ‘agent relativity’ (relativity of the agent’s values), he revisits the 
unfortunate Hitler example as follows: 
 
The critic will not be able to say, for example, ‘It was morally wrong of Hitler 
to have acted in that way,’ if the critic is a moral relativist who supposes that 
Hitler did not have a compelling objective reason to refrain from acting as he 
did… (Harman 1996, p. 62). 
 
Clearly, Harman intends ‘moral framework’ as most basically equivalent to 
‘individual moral outlook’, so that it is a contingent question how far a given outlook 
is shared throughout society. On Harman’s conception, Hitler’s ‘moral framework’ 
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stubbornly places him beyond the reach of moral judgement by non-fascists, even the 
judgement of those whose lives his actions directly affected. But this is patently 
absurd. The idea that Nazi ideology qualifies as a ‘moral framework’ is an extreme 
version of the mistaken assumption that we saw Moody-Adams expose in relation to 
relativist attitudes to exoticism; namely, the assumption that local bodies of value 
automatically qualify as complete moral outlooks, all dissenting voices being deemed 
external. In nineteen-thirties Germany a Nazi ideology surely gained the ascendancy; 
but a moral culture is more than an incumbent ideology, more than what is got away 
with by the powerful. The moral culture of Germany in the time of Hitler included the 
cognitive resources of dissent and resistance expressible by its victims, and indeed 
among its more inchoately dissident insiders too.
15
 
 
 There is room for doubt, indeed, about the whole conception of a moral 
framework understood by way of analogy with spatio-temporal co-ordinates. I have 
already emphasized the presence of resources for contestation in any real moral 
culture. Stephen Darwall emphasized a different point of disanalogy:  
 
A doesn’t simply believe that not helping those in need is wrong in relation to 
his values, principles, and norms. Rather he accepts those values and norms 
and, in doing so, thinks that going counter to them is wrong period….In the 
motion case, however, A and B have no such relation to their spatio-temporal 
positions…’ (Darwall 1998, p. 186). 
 
The basic moral rules and principles that constitute a moral framework—imagined by 
Harman as a complex background premise to all our moral judgements—are 
themselves in the fray of moral attitudes and judgements susceptible to critical 
assessment, endorsement or rejection. The nature of moral judgement and 
interpretation is much more holistic than the ‘moral co-ordinates’ metaphor allows. 
 
This mismatch between the Neurath’s boat of moral culture and the static 
metaphor of a moral framework is connected with the difficulty, for Harman, of 
accounting for moral change. What critical impetus makes moral attitudes develop 
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historically? Harman accounts for it in terms of ‘moral bargaining’. The idea that 
morality is an ongoing bargained compromise between people with different degrees 
of wealth and power is argued for largely on the grounds that it can explain why we 
regard the obligation not to harm others as a much stronger principle than the 
obligation to help others, for such a ranking obviously suits the rich and powerful 
(Harman 1996, p. 25). A similar line of argument is given in relation to the way our 
moral attitudes tend to favour the wellbeing of humans over animals. This mini-
genealogy of the development of moral values, however, backfires. The idea that the 
driving impulse in moral change is that of the bargain—and the competition of 
interests that it represents—surely does reflect some of the real politik of moral life, 
but it cannot possibly capture the character of moral argument. Moral argument is 
moral reasoning, and although it is true that when moral arguments are made by the 
down-trodden then their arguments will inter alia be such as to serve their interests, it 
would not be a moral argument at all if its grounds were mere self-interest. The 
grounds of a moral argument must be some form of justice. Moral argument may 
involve sticking up for oneself, but it may equally, and in the same terms, be a matter 
of sticking up for others. The whole idea of a bargain does not belong to moral 
reasoning. Real moral debate may often be intertwined with bargain making, but it is 
not the same thing.  
 
 If, however, we allow Harman’s reduction of moral argument to bargaining, 
what are the implications for moral truth? Here Harman takes up a ready-made 
expressivist or projectivist position, so that moral truth, and its cognates such as moral 
reason and moral justification, are all dealt with in the familiar as-if or quasi mode. 
Indeed he refers to his general strategy of accommodating these concepts as ‘quasi-
absolutism’. When we speak of moral truths, and no matter what we intend, we are 
really speaking of something ersatz. He uses capitals for the quasi-absolutist (QA) 
usage: 
 
For example, in saying that raising animals for food is WRONG, Veronica 
expresses her approval of moral standards that would prohibit the practice. In 
saying that raising animals for food is not WRONG, Archie expresses 
approval of standards that do not prohibit raising animals for food (Harman 
1996, p. 35). 
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In making this move, Harman is in company with many moral expressivists, and in 
line with a notion of ‘relative truth’ defended for instance by Foot in her non-partisan 
investigation of the coherence of moral relativism (Foot 2001). For Harman, the local 
conventions that constitute morality admit of quasi-truth, where this is to be 
understood as true-relative-to-the-subject’s-moral-framework. This question of truth 
refers us to the next branch of our relativist family tree: that of Moral Truth. We could 
picture Harman’s quasi-absolutism on this branch, but I have featured it on the Moral 
Reasons branch because of the more distinctive and more basic motivating role that 
the idea of shared reasons plays in his view. Furthermore, the relativism I shall 
discuss in connection with moral truth is fundamentally different from all those whose 
genealogy I have so far traced. These views have all stemmed from subjectivism 
specifically about value, conceived by way of contrast with an objective physical 
realm. The relativism I shall discuss under the head of moral truth, however, stems 
instead from a global subjectivism. The attitude to moral truth that it produces is 
therefore differently oriented from the one we have seen embraced by Harman. It is a 
globally sceptical attitude to the very idea of truth as we (allegedly) commonly 
understand it. This places morality on a strange par with non-evaluative factual 
discourse, and it means that the issues thrown up for morality have a different aspect. 
The worry that moral judgements might turn out to be less than they’re cracked up to 
be is no longer a matter of their objectivity comparing disappointingly with that of 
judgements about the physical world; but rather that the psychological demands of 
maintaining moral conviction turn out to be a special case of a quite general problem 
about sustaining convictions of any kind in parallel with a commitment to global 
scepticism about truth. The species of moral relativism we encounter as we look along 
the branch of Moral Truth is one whose deconstructionist energy connected 
philosophical relativism directly to the wider postmodernist zeitgeist of the seventies 
and eighties. I turn to the pragmatism of Richard Rorty. 
 
 
Moral Truth  
 
I use ‘ironist’ to name the sort of person who faces up to the contingency of 
his or her own most central beliefs and desires—someone sufficiently 
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historicist and nominalist to have abandoned the idea that those central beliefs 
and desires refer back to something beyond the reach of time and chance. 
Liberal ironists are people who include among these ungroundable desires 
their own hope that suffering will be diminished, that the humiliation of 
human beings by other human beings may cease (Rorty 1990, p. xv). 
 
Rorty’s ‘ironism’ is an intriguing form of moral relativism because its philosophical 
motivations are not special to matters of value, and yet morality none the less poses a 
special problem in his view—or at any rate, a problem for which he proposes a 
special solution. ‘Ironism’ is the solution; so what is the problem? The problem is: 
how to retain moral conviction if one believes morality has turned out to be radically 
different from what it seemed—not absolute but relative, not a system of beliefs 
aiming to match an independent objective morality but a contingent social construct 
or language game. The problem is one of preserving first order moral conviction in 
the face of moral scepticism at the reflective level (a general issue that Williams 
flagged up in terms of the risk of our moral commitments becoming unstable under 
reflection). It is a globally sourced version, then, of a problem which in its localized 
form confronts any moral relativist position, and more broadly any error theoretical 
account of morality. 
 
Ironism is an error theory in all but name. The term ‘error theory’ of course 
comes from Mackie’s moral scepticism, though it is a Humean sceptical trope played 
out in a new key. Hume held a parallel view concerning a range of things about whose 
existence he was sceptical—the idea of a necessary connection between cause and 
effect, for instance, or the idea of the self—but interestingly never in relation to moral 
conviction, which was not debunked but rather explained, indeed vindicated, in 
Hume’s naturalistic approach. The Hume-style sceptical treatment was meted out to 
morality only by Mackie, whose naturalism was of a very different genus. Mackie 
diagnosed an objectivist error in moral consciousness; namely, an erroneous 
commitment to the strong metaphysical objectivity of moral value. The error is 
conceived—rather as Hume conceived our commitment to the necessary connection 
between cause and effect, et cetera—as irremediable, because so deep-seated in our 
psychological habits. Mackie regarded the objectivist presumption as integral to our 
moral experience and language. Taking the truth-aptitude of moral statements at face 
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value, he is the most pessimistic of cognitivists, picturing the objectivist error as 
implicit in all such statements, and so finding them uniformly false. The point of the 
error theory is to reconcile the sceptical meta-ethics with the continuation of ordinary 
authoritative moral talk and experience, error and all. But how to go on? (Should we 
cross our fingers behind our backs whenever we express a moral conviction?) 
 
Mackie’s error theory depended on the idea that we cannot help the error, but 
while Hume before him could plausibly suggest that our minds cannot help but posit a 
necessary causal connection, or a self, or whatever it might be, it is thoroughly 
implausible to suggest that the very nature of moral language and experience 
irrevocably leads our minds to spread intrinsically motivating, metaphysically 
objective moral values on the world. I believe the proposal is both intellectualist and 
historically naïve. Intellectualist because it supposes that such a highly specific set of 
philosophical commitments could be built into our everyday moral talk and 
experience as such (not to mention such an unpromising bunch of commitments—few 
moral objectivists would own them); and historically naïve because to imagine that 
moral experience should be unchanging through every moral social setting—religious 
or secular, ascetic or libertine, traditionalist or relativistic—is to be in denial about the 
contingency of moral phenomenology. But I shall not develop these points, since our 
present interest in Mackie is confined to the parallel that his error theory makes with 
Rorty’s ironist strategy. By dividing the moral subject into two personae, that of the 
‘private ironist’ (the sceptical philosopher) and that of the ‘public liberal’ (the morally 
engaged agent), he aims to reconcile his pragmatist brand of scepticism with 
continued engagement in the business of caring morally about other people’s 
suffering: 
 
The core of my book [Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity] is a distinction 
between private concerns, in the sense of idiosyncratic projects of self-
overcoming, and public concerns, those having to do with the suffering of 
other human beings (Rorty 1998, pp. 307-8, note 2). 
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But the threat to authoritative morality is not quite banished, because the two 
personae of private ironist and public liberal cannot be entirely separated. By Rorty’s 
own account, there is a porous psychological boundary, so that ironists are never 
‘quite able to take themselves seriously because always aware that the terms in which 
they describe themselves are subject to change, always aware of the contingency and 
fragility of their final vocabularies, and thus of their selves’ (Rorty 1990, pp. 73-4).  
Moral seriousness, or what I have been variously calling authority or conviction, is 
undermined. Given the commitments of the split personality, this must be right. There 
can be no hermetic seal between morally committed and sceptical stances in one and 
the same person. The failure to appreciate this instability was Mackie’s own error. 
Rorty is more sanguine, and his conclusion is a shrug of personal resignation to 
accompany his easy, frank advice: Relax, and learn to live with the tension. 
 
 I do not see how we could live with so great a tension for long. It is fortunate, 
then, that we do not have to, for the tension in question is a chimera. It is generated 
only by Rorty’s continued implicit commitment to the very conception (the 
‘metaphysical’ or ‘representationalist’ conception) of moral truth that he urges us to 
jettison. He evidently still regards moral ‘seriousness’ as requiring some such 
metaphysical attitude (that is why ironists cannot quite take themselves seriously). 
Therein lies his error. The rhetoric is repeatedly that of the ‘Truth cannot be out there’ 
variety,
16
 but with the coming of age of deflationist accounts, one can only ask, 
Whoever would think that it was? Given a metaphysically undemanding conception 
of truth, and the consequent easy possibility not only of moral truth but moral 
knowledge too (all available on a subjectivist conception of value), Rorty’s scepticism 
comes to look decidedly quixotic. In short, his principled wish to shake off 
representationalism regarding the true could have been well served by a 
disquotational conception; yet he tilted at anything going by the name of truth. He 
embraced instead a notion of ‘conversation’, designed to do service for truth and 
reason duly relieved of the burden of seriousness. He saw a need for this because he 
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assumed that anyone taking truth or reason seriously must be wedded to the 
representationalist conception he eschewed: ‘“Reason,” as the term is used in the 
Platonic and Kantian traditions, is interlocked with the notions of truth as 
correspondence, of knowledge as discovery of essence, of morality as obedience to 
principle, all the notions which the pragmatist tried to deconstruct’ (Rorty 1982, p. 
172). But Rorty’s assumption quickly proved mistaken, inasmuch as alternative 
serious conceptions of truth and reason emerged in the evolving philosophical 
literature, a literature which he (ironically for a declared historicist) imagined as stuck 
in time, essentializing it in terms of the ‘Platonic and Kantian traditions’.  
  
 Rorty’s conception of ‘conversation’ is meant to do without seriousness 
because it styles itself as aspiring not to truth but only to ‘solidarity’. The aim of all 
such discourse, we are told, and the signature aim of the public liberal, is to ever-
expand the circle of those we call ‘us’. But even solidarity is aspired to for a reason—
grounds of justice, for instance, or equality. These are concepts that make an intrinsic 
claim to objectivity; they are the sort of thing that people argue for, rather than just 
bargaining with. Further, the objectivity-claiming discourse Rorty was entreating us 
to ditch was too often the only platform the powerless had to stand on. This point was 
powerfully made from a feminist perspective by Sabina Lovibond. Identifying Rorty’s 
pragmatism as a species of postmodernism, she posed the challenging rhetorical 
question: ‘How can anyone ask me to say goodbye to “emancipatory metanarratives” 
when my own emancipation is still such a patchy, hit-or-miss affair?’ (Lovibond 
1989, p. 12). 
 
Rorty of course hoped we could continue to use even our grandest 
emancipatory moral concepts, if with a resigned nudge and a wink, in the name of a 
self-consciously ‘ethnocentric’ approach to ethical thinking. But embracing 
ethnocentrism adds nothing. It is just a device to put all our objectivity-claiming 
moral concepts in scare quotes, pre-empting accusations of seriousness in seeking 
solidarity, and so of hypocrisy or self-refutation. The relevant problem with Rorty’s 
moral ironism is indeed not that it is self-refuting (it isn’t), but rather that it would be 
psychologically unsustainable, given the intrinsically objectivity-seeking nature of 
moral argument. Rorty is aware of this worry, but he bills it as a purely practical 
challenge, ‘the practical question of whether the notion of “conversation” can 
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substitute for that of “reason”’ (Rorty 1982, p. 172). There is indeed an important 
practical question (Will we be able to keep up the business of moral conviction?), but 
there is also a philosophical complaint to be made: Rorty sells truth and reason short, 
by characterizing them as serious only on a representationalist conception. This 
reiterates the error I drew attention to earlier. Contrary to Rorty’s philosophical 
pessimism, anti-representationalists do not have to learn to take truth and reason non-
seriously, for there are serious yet non-representationalist conceptions available. As 
before, ironism became not only psychologically unsustainable, but philosophically 
unmotivated. 
  
 We might want to retain something of Rorty’s commitment to the contingency 
of morality, even while we reject his ironism. A sensible historicism implies a degree 
of moral contingency, and contingency implies pluralism. Moral pluralism calls for 
strong forms of non-dogmatism and open-mindedness in relation to one’s moral 
views—what Isaiah Berlin described as a willingness to help ‘maintain a precarious 
equilibrium’ of competing values (Berlin 1959, p. 18). Openness to the revision of 
one’s moral ideas must of course be a desideratum for any moral thinker, on whatever 
meta-ethical view. But in Berlin’s case we greet a strong version of the point, because 
it is not intended simply as a warning against having too high an opinion of one’s own 
moral point of view. Rather, the point is made as an integral part of his commitment 
to pluralism about moral outlooks, a pluralism which organized his thinking about the 
moral and political order. For Berlin, moral pluralism entailed the permanent 
importance of keeping an open mind in the strong sense of regarding one’s set of 
moral commitments as one among a range of possibilities. Here I believe we can 
sense a deep connection between Berlin’s pluralism and the historicist approach to 
morality advanced by Williams. They embraced the contingency of morality, and the 
freedom it implied, in similar spirit.  
 
And so the final branch of our relativist family tree as I have drawn it is that of 
Moral Plurality. Moral pluralism can find non-relativist expression, as it did in 
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Berlin’s writing
17
; but it can also be advanced specifically as a form of moral 
relativism. So it is by David Wong. 
 
 
Moral Plurality 
 
If pluralistic relativism is going to work as a fully spelled out meta-ethical position, it 
must supply a convincing account of what constrains the plurality of acceptable 
moralities. David Wong aims to do just that: ‘A distinctive feature of my naturalistic 
account is that it generates significant constraints on what could count as an adequate 
morality, given its functions and given human nature’ (Wong 2006, p. 44).  
 
His account echoes a brief genealogical story of morality told by the Chinese 
philosopher Xunzi: 
 
On Xunzi’s genealogy of morality, the ancient sage-kings saw the need to 
control the inborn tendency of human beings to seek gain, which consists in 
satisfying desires of the ear and eye. The fact that such desires have no natural 
limit makes for chaos when combined with scarcity of resources. The sage-
kings invented within ritual and moral principles in order to apportion things, 
to nurture the desires of men, and to supply the means for their satisfaction 
(Wong 2006, p. 38).  
 
As Wong notes, the argument also echoes a story that Plato puts in Protagoras’ mouth 
to the effect that Zeus gave human beings the virtues of reverence and justice, and the 
bonds of friendship and conciliation, because without these virtues co-ordinated life 
in cities would be impossible. Both genealogical stories give narrative form to the fact 
that certain basic values or virtues are necessary conditions for social co-ordination 
and co-operation. More specifically, Wong breaks these down into a number of 
conditions on any acceptable moral system. It must: regulate intrapersonal 
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 For a more recent exponent of non-relativist pluralism, see Raz, 2003. Maria 
Baghramian has also argued for the advantages of moral pluralism over relativism 
(see Baghramian 2004, 9.6). 
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psychological features of the agent; regulate interpersonal co-ordination; incorporate a 
norm of reciprocity; place constraints relating to balancing self- and other-concern; it 
must also be justifiable to those ‘governed’ by the moral norms; and finally it must 
require that people can handle disagreement constructively, something Wong labels 
‘accommodation’. 
 
 The requirement that any acceptable morality incorporate some intrapersonal 
function is best thought of in immediate relation to the requirement of interpersonal 
function. Obviously, someone whose selfish drives are insufficiently moderated 
cannot be a good social co-operator; and so a morality must impose pressures to shape 
individual agents’ motivations in a manner that facilitates sociability. These two 
‘functions’ of morality effectively give rise to the requirement of the norm of 
reciprocity (the proportional return of good for good) as a way of bolstering social 
cooperation in the face of self-interest: 
 
Moral norms need to take into account the strength of self-interest in order to 
accommodate that motivation and to encourage its integration with 
motivations that more directly lead to acting on behalf of others. Moralities, 
then, should not merely restrain actions from self-interest or encourage the 
development of opposing motivations, though they do these things. They 
should provide outlets for the expression of self-interest that can be consistent 
with the expression of other-directed motivations (Wong 2006, p. 51). 
 
 The requirement that morality incorporate some way of balancing self- and 
other-concern (egoistic and altruistic impulses) is argued for in relation to evidence 
for the place of altruistic motives in evolutionary theory. Once again, the idea here is 
to bolster the interpersonal function; that is, to give some scientific support for the 
claim that any acceptable morality will ensure interpersonal cooperation rather than 
merely selfish behaviour. This does not add a new condition on morality, but rather 
lends empirical support to the interpersonal social-cooperative function that is the 
organizing idea of Wong’s universalist constraint. 
 
 At this point it is worth raising a potential objection: Is the kind of cooperative 
social functionality that Wong argues to be a universal condition on acceptable 
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moralities really strong enough? Or, rather, can it be a strong enough requirement 
without invoking more substantive and local moral ideas? Take women. Was it, or 
was it not, a socially functional society in Britain that kept women in their place as 
disenfranchised, legally second-class citizens through the nineteenth-century, albeit 
often with considerable informal forms of domestic power? I do not know the answer 
to this question. Since the situation was unjust to women, it is tempting to deem it 
thereby a non-functional, insufficiently co-operative society. But that would probably 
be false. One’s moral complaint is not really that the society failed in terms of social 
cooperation. On the contrary, men and women co-operated plenty, and while society 
as a whole may not have been optimal from the point of view of human resources, 
still it functioned all right. It is therefore a useful question to pose in relation to 
Wong’s pluralism whether the condition of social cooperation can constrain morality 
sufficiently so that his view does not, on closer inspection, come to resemble a much 
cruder ‘their rules are right for them’ moral relativism. 
 
 Wong, however, has an answer to this worry, for this is where his condition of 
justification to those governed by the morality comes in. His discussion makes clear 
that he regards this constraint as requiring that any given moral system must be 
justifiable to all those subject to its norms, and that includes its down-trodden. To use 
my example, Wong would say that the nineteenth-century morality that deprived 
women of the vote was only acceptable in so far as it could have been justified to 
them, and without trading in falsehoods. But now a worry surely arises from the other 
direction: the condition of justification to the governed is a very strong liberal 
condition, not plausibly represented as straightforwardly deriving from the condition 
of social co-operation. This, however, may not be an insurmountable problem, so long 
as the condition is defended independently as a condition in its own right, without too 
much tension with the pluralist framework. The condition does indeed fit Wong’s 
purpose in that it permits a plurality of moralities in just the manner intended: a 
community-based morality, for instance, might be one that could be justified to the 
least powerful, just as a more individualistic rights-based moral system might be 
justified to its least powerful members.  
 
 The final condition, stemming more directly from the requirement of social 
cooperation and coordination, is that of ‘accommodation’. Moral cultures are sites of 
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internal moral plurality and dissent (‘ambivalence’), and this means that a well-
functioning society will be able to handle moral disagreement well: 
 
Given the inevitability of serious disagreement within all kinds of moral 
traditions that have any degree of complexity, a particular sort of ethical value 
becomes especially important for the stability and integrity of these traditions 
and societies. Let me call this value ‘accommodation’. To have this value is to 
be committed to supporting noncoercive and constructive relations with others 
although they have ethical beliefs that conflict with one’s own (Wong 2006, p. 
64).  
 
Contemplating this condition of accommodation and the likelihood that it will often 
take the form of constructing moral agreements of various kinds (including agreeing 
to disagree), we might be moved to ask, Is this pluralism really a kind of relativism? 
The answer is surely Yes. Although it has a substantial universalist core, provided by 
the two requirements of social co-operation and justification to the governed, still the 
remainder has a relativist structure: people and their actions are to be judged 
according to the values of their culture. At this point, the argument made above in 
relation to the Samurai practice of tsujigiri returns, however, to complicate the 
picture. Even if Wong is right that after the basic moral constraint of social co-
ordination, plus justifiability to the governed, the rest of morality is up for social 
invention in a manner that relativizes moral judgement, still we should interrogate any 
easy reference to this thing called ‘moral culture’. As I argued in the first section, 
agreeing with Moody-Adams, there is almost always marginal moral-interpretive 
space for the expression of dissent and challenge to the moral status quo, and this puts 
pressure on the pluralist idea that two apparently different moral cultures really are 
deeply different. Wong, however, need not be on the defensive over this, for he builds 
in to his conception of moral culture that it is a site of ongoing disagreement—indeed 
this much is guaranteed by the fact of value pluralism, which naturally generates 
disagreement and a consequent need for accommodation. Accordingly his conception 
of moral cultures is such that they have an ‘open texture’, and that ‘moralities 
themselves are uneasy, somewhat indeterminate combinations of values that are not 
easily held together’ (Wong 1995, p. 396). 
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 A picture such as Wong’s makes for an attractive hybrid, capable of 
reconciling the universalistic dynamic in moral thinking with its relativistic aspects. It 
may well be that the best future for meta-ethics in relation to the universalist-relativist 
tension is to stop trying to press all of morality into one mould or the other, but to 
look and see more carefully what sorts of relativizations we are inclined to make in 
our most sensitive moral thinking, so that we might differentiate that which is 
contingent and relative from that which is humanly necessary and so universal. I 
suspect that the moral pluralist branch of our family tree, a close cousin of 
historicism, may prove to be the strongest relativist line.
18
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